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Stark illustrations of the dangers from chemical weapons can be seen in attacks using toxic industrial 
chemicals and sarin against civilians and combatants in Syria and toxic industrial chemicals in Iraq, as 
well as more targeted assassination operations in Malaysia and the United Kingdom, employing VX 
and novichok nerve agents, respectively. Concerns about such malign applications of chemical 
technology are exacerbated by the unstable international security environment and the changing 
nature of armed conflict, “where borderlines between war, civil war, large-scale violations of human 
rights, revolutions and uprisings, insurgencies and terrorism as well as organized crime are 
blurred” (1).  It is thus essential that the global community regularly review the nature and 
implications of developments in chemistry, and its convergence with the life and associated 
sciences, and establish appropriate   measures   to prevent their misuse. With the parties to 
the Chemical Weapons Convention  (CWC)  convening  a Review Conference to address such issues 
beginning 21 November 2018, we highlight important scientific aspects (2). 
COMPREHENSIVE PROHIBITION 
The CWC is a multilateral treaty in effect since 1997 that proscribes the development, production, 
stockpiling, transfer, and use of chemical weapons “under any circumstances” and requires 
their destruction within a specified time period. The CWC allows the use of toxic chemicals  for a 
range of industrial, agricultural, research, medical, pharmaceutical, or other peaceful purposes, 
including law enforcement, as long as the “types and quantities” of chemicals employed are 
“consistent with such purposes.” The CWC has declaration requirements (obliging States to 
detail facilities that produce or use certain chemicals of concern, grouped into three “schedules,” 
based on the risk they pose to the CWC), industry inspections, and other verification measures 
to ensure that toxic chemicals and related technologies are not misused in weapons 
production and to investigate alleged chemical weapons use. 
The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which is the implementing body 
of the CWC, comprises the 193 State Parties and a Technical Secretariat that provides technical 
assistance to States, routinely inspects relevant State and commercial industrial facilities, and 
monitors activities to ensure compliance. It was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2013 for 
overseeing and facilitating the verified destruction of most of the declared chemical weapons stocks 
produced in the last century—to date totalling more than 96% (69,750 metric tons) of the declared 
stockpiles of chemical agents. Now that this first phase of the CWC’s implementation is nearing 
completion, the OPCW has to increasingly focus on preventing the re-emergence of chemical 
weapons. Thus, in addition to combatting possession and employment of 20th-century chemical 
weapons types, the OPCW must also address a changing external environment where the risks 
associated with toxic chemicals and their potential misuse as weapons are be- coming more diffuse 
and less well defined in terms of chemical compounds or dissemination methods. To respond 
effectively to such shifts and maintain the comprehensive nature of the chemical weapons 
prohibition, the OPCW should prioritize key issues below. 
Ensure effective implementation of the General Purpose Criterion 
Although the CWC includes three schedules of toxic chemicals for the application of verification 
measures, the scope of the CWC is not constrained to these schedules but by its General Purpose 
Criterion (GPC), which prohibits misuse of toxic chemicals based on intent rather than on this limited 
list of chemicals (3). The CWC negotiators sought to ensure that the CWC could accommodate, and 
the States Parties be able to respond to, future developments in chemistry, biology, and associated 
sciences and technologies. Consequently, “even toxic chemicals whose existence is not yet known 
are covered,” while “legitimate uses of all toxic chemicals and chemicals from which they can be 
made” are protected (4). 
But there is contested interpretation of the GPC as to the range of chemicals and delivery 
mechanisms that could be employed for law enforcement, and the nature of what constitutes 
legitimate use. The up- coming Review Conference should thus establish an Open-Ended Working 
Group (OEWG) involving scientific experts to design guidelines to prevent research, development, 
production, and employment activities that, while purportedly intended to support law enforcement, 
would undermine the prohibitions of the CWC. The OEWG should consider existing obligations under 
international law, notably, international human rights law (IHRL), and their bearing on the CWC. The 
OEWG should specifically address the following: 
1) Riot control agents (RCAs). The CWC defines RCAs—such as tear gas and pepper spray—as “any
chemical not listed” in one of its three schedules that can produce “rapidly in humans sensory
irritation or disabling physical effects which disappear within a short time following termination of
exposure.” Thus, chemicals should only be employed as RCAs if there is solid scientific evidence to
show that such agents are not dangerous to humans when used in an appropriate manner. The CWC
permits their use for “law enforcement including domestic riot control” (5), as long as the “types and
quantities” (6) are consistent with such purposes. However, a recurring concern documented by the
medical community and human rights monitors has been the widespread misuse of RCAs by police
and security forces in excessive quantities, including in hospitals, prisons, homes, and automobiles,
where targeted individuals cannot disperse. In such situations, serious injury or death can result
from toxic proper- ties of chemicals or from asphyxiation.
Although a variety of chemicals were developed, considered, or used as RCAs in the past century, 
the OPCW Scientific Advisory Board (SAB, comprised of independent experts) clarified that only 17 
chemicals from the 60 it examined were consistent with the RCA definition under the CWC (7). For 
example, certain States designated Adamsite (DM) as an RCA, but it has been removed from this 
category because of its danger to human  health [(7), appendix 3]. The OEWG should now clarify the 
nature and scope of “law enforcement” activities and develop guidance as to “types and quantities” 
of RCAs that can legitimately be used in such circumstances, highlighting obligations under IHRL. 
2) Delivery systems. If the OPCW does not take appropriate action on RCAs, the situation could
dramatically worsen as a result of ongoing development and marketing of systems capable of
delivering far greater amounts of RCAs (and potentially other toxic chemicals) over wider areas or
more extended distances than current standard law enforcement delivery mechanisms, such as
hand- held sprays, grenades, and single launched projectiles. Such new systems include large- 
capacity spraying devices, automatic grenade launchers, multibarrel projectile launchers, large-
caliber RCA projectiles, and unmanned ground or aerial vehicles capable of carry- ing spraying
devices or projectile launchers (8). The OEWG should develop criteria for determining which means
of delivering and dispersing RCAs are inconsistent with the purpose of law enforcement and should 
thus be prohibited. Such prohibited means of delivery should, at a minimum, include artillery shells, 
aerial bombs, mortar shells, and cluster munitions. 
 
3) Incapacitating chemical agent (ICA) weapons. Although the CWC permits use of appropriate types 
and quantities of RCAs for law enforcement, certain countries have conducted research into 
weapons employing other distinct toxic chemicals, so-called ICAs. Not separately defined under the 
CWC, ICAs can be considered as a range of toxic chemicals—only one of which [3-quinuclidi- nyl 
benzilate (BZ) and two of its immediate precursors] is currently scheduled—including anaesthetics 
and other pharmaceutical chemicals that are purportedly intended to act on the body’s core 
biochemical and physiological systems, notably the central nervous system (CNS), to cause 
prolonged but non- permanent disability. Such CNS-acting chemicals can produce unconsciousness, 
sedation, hallucination, incoherence, disorientation, or paralysis. With inappropriate doses, how- 
ever, death can result. Leading medical and scientific organizations have highlighted grave dangers 
to health and well-being of such weapons (9); in the only confirmed ex- ample of their large-scale 
use, an aerosolized mixture of two anesthetics—carfentanil and remifentanil—employed by Russian 
security forces to end the Moscow theatre siege of October 2002 caused the deaths of 125 of the 
900 hostages (10). 
As the U.S. Ambassador to the OPCW noted in October of this year, “The United States and many 
other States Parties are seriously concerned that some States may be developing these chemicals for 
warfare…while cloaking their efforts as legitimate activities such as law enforcement” (11). The U.S. 
concern is reflected in a recent Department of Defense solicitation that “seeks to develop field 
diagnostic capabilities for detection of exposure to the ever-growing opioid class of chemical threat 
agents.” 
The chemical threat spectrum includes bioregulators and toxins, and our increasing understanding of 
the CNS is likely to uncover many more potential targets and agent classes that might be 
weaponized. Scientists should be aware of such possibilities and be able to alert their CWC National 
Authority and the OPCW Technical Secretariat to potential dangers. The OEWG could determine 
either that development, stockpiling, transfer, and use of ICA weapons for law enforcement are 
prohibited under the CWC or that such actions are permitted but should be severely restricted. 
Improve OPCW monitoring and risk assessment of science and technology 
In 2011, an expert panel recommended that the OPCW should “improve and widen the scope of 
monitoring and evaluating developments in chemical science and technology” (12). In 2013, in 
response to such concerns, the OPCW appointed a Science Policy Adviser at the Technical Secretariat. 
In addition, over the past 5 years, the SAB has regularly provided technical reports and briefings on 
key scientific and technological (S&T) developments. Building upon these advances, and informed by 
SAB recommendations (13), the OPCW  should  consider  further  measures to strengthen the 
Technical Secretariat’s capability to monitor and forecast S&T developments and their implications, 
and to strengthen its ability and mandate to proactively bring specific cases of concern to the 
attention of the States Parties. However, this is not something that the OPCW can do alone, given 
the range of scientific disciplines and technologies that need to be monitored, their complexity, their 
rapidity of advance, and the geographical scope of research and development. Thus the 
nongovernmental chemical and life scientific community, in particular, has an important role to play 
by undertaking technology tracking of generic trends in technologies of relevance to the CWC (as has 
been undertaken previously by the International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry in preparation 
for previous CWC Review Conferences), and by undertaking targeted research into S&T 
developments of particular concern, for example, in the fields of medicinal chemistry, pharmacology, 
synthetic biology, nanotechnology, and, as undertaken by the Royal Society, neuroscience (9). 
 
IMPLEMENTATION AND VERIFICATION 
Advances in S&T may have several effects on national implementation of the CWC by its States 
Parties and on how the OPCW verification mechanisms function, which the Review Conference 
should address. 
Update industry verification measures 
OPCW verification measures currently focus on the list of scheduled chemicals, which were 
previously identified from past State chemical weapons programs. But new production pathways to 
old chemical warfare agents may become feasible as a result of technological advances; alternatively, 
new potential chemical warfare agent types may become relevant involving toxic chemicals not 
listed on any of the schedules. Consequently, the routine industry verification regime (as well as the 
analytical methods and databases available for challenge inspection and for investigation of alleged 
chemical weapons use) need to be adapted to these new technological and chemical realities. The 
SAB has suggested that “efforts to ensure that the verification regime remains effective would 
benefit from more extensive  engagement  with  technical experts from industry, and review of 
industry-focused research and development, including the driving forces for adoption of new 
technologies into industrial processes” (13). Favourable consideration should also be given to 
updating the schedules themselves (13), at least to provide indicators of the new or additional types 
of potential chemical agents (and their precursors) of concern, such as the novichock agent (and its 
associated families). 
 
Other chemical production facilities 
Other chemical production facilities (OCPFs) are chemical plants that do not currently produce, but 
are capable of manufacturing, chemical warfare agents or precursors. At present, a small fraction of 
declared OCPFs are selected for verification by the OPCW; the Review Conference should consider 
authorizing a substantial increase in OCPF inspections per year. The OPCW should also be directed to 
refine the process of site selection so as to target inspections on multipurpose chemical plants that 
pose the greatest risk of being utilized for prohibited purposes. 
 
Biological and biologically mediated pro- cesses for production of discrete organic chemicals 
Some products and processes used by the biomanufacturing industry are as relevant to the CWC as 
those used by other OCPF facilities, including those the Technical Secretariat considers pose notable 
risks. Thus, the SAB has consistently recommended that biomanufacturing of chemical products 
should be covered under the scope of the CWC. How- ever, States Parties have yet to agree on how 
to treat these types of production processes and facilities. The Review Conference should follow SAB 
advice and establish measures to determine the relevance of various types of biomanufacturing 
processes and facilities for CWC verification purposes. 
 PREVENTING AND RESPONDING 
The OPCW should continue improvements in  the  operational  and  technical  capacity of the 
Technical Secretariat to conduct challenge  inspections  and  investigations  of alleged use of 
chemical  weapons,  with an increased focus on chemical forensics. An important development in 
this regard was the June 2018 decision to empower the OPCW to develop an attribution mechanism 
to determine who conducted a chemical at- tack (14). Ongoing work by the SAB into opportunities 
and difficulties associated with chemical forensics will enable the OPCW to most effectively utilize 
new tools and methods. Such work, which would benefit from wide consultation with scientific 
experts, must be complemented by efforts to com- pile, expand, and properly curate the data- bases 
of reference spectra and collections of reference materials that will be needed for such forensic 
analysis. 
The SAB highlighted the critical role of biomedical samples in investigations of alleged use of toxic 
chemicals and recommended that the Technical Secretariat should “actively encourage further 
research on potential markers of exposure to such chemicals.” The OPCW should also build on the 
considerable progress made toward developing a network of designated laboratories for the analysis 
of biomedical and biological samples (15). Advances in other fields could also facilitate more 
effective evidence collection, for example, exploring the potential of unmanned aerial vehicles to 
support recon- naissance, detection, and chain of custody. The OPCW should also consider how best 
to strengthen the resilience of States against hostile use of toxic chemicals. This could include 
expanding the number of viable national protective programs supported by OPCW training and 
capacity building, and the establishment of well-equipped regional capacities for effective response 
to the use of chemical weapons or the accidental release of toxic chemicals. 
 
SCIENTISTS AND AN EVOLVING OPCW 
The OPCW faces the task of deciding how best to evolve to prevent the reemergence of chemical 
weapons in a period of rapid scientific change and unstable international security. There is growing 
recognition within the OPCW of the vital importance of engaging with and ensuring the support of 
the world- wide scientific community, in particular via relationships with professional societies (13). 
Chemical and life scientists could play their part by being better informed of the issues at stake, and 
by ensuring that their colleagues and students are alerted to the dangers of the misuse of dual-use 
technologies and are implementing relevant ethical codes, codes of conduct, and the Hague Ethical 
Guidelines recently developed by the OPCW to promote a culture of responsible conduct in the 
chemical sciences and to guard against the misuse of chemistry for malign intent.  
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